Afterword: an end to imagining? by Wardle, Huon
(DRAFT) Afterword to Harris, M. and N. Rapport (eds.) Reflections on Imagination. Forthcoming 
2015. 
 
PART III : REVIEW 
CHAPTER 15 
 
Afterword: An end to imagining? 
 
Huon Wardle 
 
 
Making present what is actually absent, is the mind’s unique gift… this gift 
is called imagination…  
Hannah Arendt 
 
Imagination… is the only inner compass we have, we are contemporaries 
only as far as our imagination reaches. If we want to be at home on this 
earth, even at the expense of being at home in this Century, we must try to 
take part in the interminable dialogue with its essence.  
Hannah Arendt 
 
When we try to understand what others are imagining, or how they are 
imagining it, we are faced with a very great initial difficulty and then with 
multiple ramifications. As anthropologists, we sometimes talk grandly of a 
certain ‘collective imagination’, of ‘collective memory’ as a type of this, or of 
the ‘anthropological imagination’ as the means of accessing it. More loosely, 
we refer to particular people’s (or peoples’) ‘ways of imagining’. However, in 
claiming this kind of knowledge we are making a primary analogy between 
what we observe about these others and qualities we truly know of ourselves 
alone. Qualitatively, I know that the other person imagines because I know it 
about myself; without this fundamental comparison with how I think I can 
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truly know nothing of what that individual may be imagining, nor how their 
imaginative capacities freight their observations and judgements as they go 
about their life.  
Jakob Meloe tells us that, as human beings, we are ‘poor observers of 
whatever activities we are not familiar with as agents’ (1988). He means that 
my ability to understand what this other person is intent upon is significantly 
limited by whether I have myself done the work of imagining-and-
perceiving involved in that kind of task, or not. Be that as it may, I do also 
depend on this other person’s view of me to be able to reflect on my own 
standpoint: their stance toward me becomes a component of my viewpoint 
as I come to imagine myself and my intentions. I do not just listen to what 
they say, I intuit and infer their view: I infer it by seeing what they do, 
noting how they stand with regard to me as well as the company they keep; 
and I register the effects all this has on me. And in that way - speaking now 
as an anthropologist - I triangulate an insight into their way of imagining by 
adopting a standpoint close to theirs and by retracing the direction, from the 
phrases and gestures that apparently guide their actions, back toward a way 
of looking out on the world that I take to be their point of view.  
Ethnography bears witness, in this respect, to a dizzying array of 
imaginative viewpoints; children of different co-wives argue in an African 
house compound: an Amazonian shaman in his hammock recounts the 
antics of the creator gods as they make the universe during the mythtime: 
gang members debate the state of business on an urban street side: singers 
at a wake for the dead in the Blue Mountains of Jamaica argue over which 
key to sing in: these views open out and fade away as our gaze shifts from 
one ethnographic scene to another. In this regard, Foucault talks of 
ethnography offering a ‘treasure-hoard of experiences and concepts’ but 
also a ‘perpetual principle of dissatisfaction’ (2003:383). So these final 
comments pick up on the tensions and dissatisfactions but also the treasure-
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seeking that anthropologists engage in when they try to ‘reflect on 
imagination’. Looking back at themes raised in this volume, I review some 
of the means and ends of an anthropology of the imaginary and the 
imaginative. 
 
Malinowski and a sketch of the anthropological imagination 
 
Max Weber tells us that, in establishing a coherent version of the lifeworld 
for any specific person or group, the social scientist is, in effect, 
constructing a ‘utopia’: their ‘as if’ articulation of the social is simultaneously 
in excess of, and significantly less than, the sum of observed facts (2012). 
Anthropologists, in that sense, write accounts that are both imaginatively 
invested and utopian in form, though this does not stop them from also 
offering true knowledge. Social scientists are not alone in this either: the 
activity of imagination, by lending coherence to a world we share with 
others, has inherently utopian (and dystopian) effects. Utopianism (and its 
shadow, dystopianism) are much needed elements of our everyday common 
sense as we go about balancing the irreconcilable in our social lives. 
Sometimes our utopias correspond quite closely to witnessable human 
reality, sometimes partly, and sometimes there is no fitting what Kant called 
the ‘crooked timber of humanity’ 1  into them at all. Either way, their 
presence in what we call the ‘anthropological imagination’, and in the 
making of an ethnography is intellectually more deliberate, so let us begin 
there. 
Few anthropologists would dispute Malinowski’s preeminence in 
establishing what we now call the ‘anthropological imagination’. His 
Argonauts of the Western Pacific is the paramount case of the ethnography 
understood as a method of imagining the lives of unfamiliar others. How 
                                                
1 ‘Warped wood’ in some translations (Kant 1983:34). 
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does Malinowski use the words imagine, imaginary, imagination? It may be 
surprising how often he deploys these words, especially at the beginning of 
his book, and he does so in three specific ways. First, he asks the reader to 
imagine herself coming to live in the Trobriand Islands: 
 
1. Imagine yourself suddenly set down surrounded by all your gear, 
alone on a tropical' beach… Imagine yourself… making your first 
entry into the village… 
2. Let us imagine that we are sailing along the South coast of New 
Guinea towards its Eastern end. 
3. [I]magine the chiefs  sitting high up on the shore under the gnarled, 
broad-leafed  branches of the shady trees. 
(1922:4,33,212) 
 
Malinowski tells his reader to shake off ‘popular’ ways of imagining ‘the 
natives’, but he does not mean that they must replace their preconceptions 
with dry scientific views. Successful ethnography should still allow a reader 
to 
 
perceive or imagine the realities of human life, the even  flow of 
everyday events, the occasional ripples of excitement  over a feast, or 
ceremony, or some singular occurrence. 
(1922:17) 
  
Malinowski explicitly and imperatively directs his reader toward the work of 
imagining other people’s lives as coherent in their own terms. He lays far 
greater emphasis on this task than did the next generation of 
anthropologists, Raymond Firth, Audrey Richards, Edward Evans-
Pritchard, for example. Roy Dilley in this volume reminds us that Evans-
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Pritchard regarded the use of empathetic imagining in ethnographic work 
with a certain suspicion and even scorn. Malinowski, however, sees the 
mutual orienting of the imagination as necessary in the relationship between 
anthropologist and reader. It is needed, in part, to dispel untruths about 
‘savage’ peoples.  
 Hence, in a second deployment of the word, Malinowski criticises 
how other social scientists, economists in particular, have, up to now, used 
the idea of ‘primitive man’ to shore up certain foundational principles in 
their textbooks. Here, Malinowski takes ‘imaginary’ in a pejorative sense to 
mean unevidenced by empirical observation, a priori and assumed – nothing 
more than a figment. In contrast, ethnographic evidence demonstrates 
 
how entirely the real native of flesh and bone differs from the 
shadowy Primitive Economic Man, on whose imaginary behaviour 
many of the scholastic deductions of abstract economics are based. 
(1922:61) 
 
Thirdly, finally, Malinowski positions himself imaginatively in the point of 
view of the Trobriand islanders themselves in Argonauts. Especially when 
he is surveying their expectations and the plans they make for their grand 
inter-island expeditions to exchange highly valued Kula goods. Malinowski 
looks at these inter-island voyages in terms of how the Trobrianders 
themselves comprehend them. Here, imagination is what binds 
Trobrianders to the future allowing them to strategise, bridging current fears 
with anticipated successes. 
 
Thus the imagination of the adventurers, as in all forms of gambling, 
must be bent towards lucky hits and turns of extraordinarily good 
chance. The Kula myths feed this imagination on stories of extreme 
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good luck, and at the same time show that it lies in the hands of man 
to bring this luck on himself, provided he acquires the necessary 
magical lore. 
(1922:328) 
 
We see, then, Malinowski trying to redirect and reshape his reader’s 
attention and their imagination, dismissing some of the utopic thinking that 
underlies Western social science while entering into the contrasting frame of 
a ‘native imagination’ – the world of his informants’ expectations and 
intentions; their vision of their world. In all these instances, he acts as 
mediator and translator, drawing the reader further away from one world of 
social expectations, their own, into another where they will learn to 
comprehend quite distinct imaginative concerns.  
 
Anthropology and productive imagining 
 
At least for Malinowski, then, anthropological work is founded in active 
imagining. The anthropologist, he proposes, must mediate between worlds 
which are usually unreflectively and conservatively imagined – the native 
worlds of ‘Westerners’ and of ‘savages’. Productive imagination becomes 
essential because only by means of it can the anthropologist and their reader 
manifest new types of concept and fact about human social life. Gellner has 
argued that Malinowski combined a bent toward empiricist fact-finding with 
a certain Central European romantic holism (1998). In particular, he was 
steeped in a version of the Germanic philosophical view that facts are 
simultaneously products of empirical experience and of active human 
imagining; that these two are an interwoven pair, not opposites. It is worth 
considering this tradition in more detail. 
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It begins with Kant’s critique of naïve empiricism. There is no reality 
unmediated by how human imagining encounters the world, argues the 
Enlightenment philosopher. The mind always meets its sensory experiences 
or ‘intuitions’ armed with prefigured analogies concerning what the world is 
like: if it were not so, understanding anything in particular would be 
impossible. For Kant imagination is the mode in which we humans, as 
fundamentally social creatures, engage with sensory experience; how, in 
particular, we make what is absent present, constituting the now of our 
experience in awareness of our memories and hopes. Things become things, 
concepts become concepts, as opposed to noise or a ‘rhapsody’ of 
unconditioned potential, because imagination actively preshapes what we 
know (1949:128). 
Common to highly diverse neo-Kantian thinkers such as Weber, 
Simmel, Piaget, Bakhtin or Sartre is the realisation that imagining is already 
entailed in any act of recognition. Even so, we are mostly unaware that 
imagination is acting in advance of what we take to be our view of the 
world. We do not feel ourselves to be imagining when we acknowledge and 
recognise some thing or some other person. But knowing for certain - 
knowing that the front plane of this building is specifically ‘Gerschom’s 
house’ - involves an anticipatory-imaginative projection out of limited points 
of salience: ‘yes, this is the one, this is the house! Do you see the cacti in the 
window?’ It is often hard to recover how those anticipations came to us, 
even though we do now know for sure that what we thought might be, truly 
is the case. ‘Look, there’s his moped!’ Hence Freud’s metaphor of 
submerged and surface knowing: the conscious self can find itself compelled 
by anticipatory knowledge that came from somewhere out of view: ‘Below’, 
according to Freud’s particular imagined geography.  
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Forms of imaginative investment – metaphors, symbols, myths, 
scripts, charters 
 
The sheer scale of coordinated social activity entails that the awareness of 
many individual people must be engaged sporadically with common objects 
of imagining in order for life together to go on. That people frequently 
reference the same points of symbolic reference can lead us to suppose that 
there exists a collective imagination, or a potential for intersubjectively 
blended imagining, or that there are epistemes - thought-templates - that 
generate the imagining of entire epochs and of the particular people therein. 
But these are metaphysical claims and, as Nigel Rapport points out in this 
volume, they can blind us to those aspects of the relationship between 
individual imagining and culture that are indeterminate and non-
symmetrical. Note how toleration, collusion, yay-saying, lipservice, accismus, 
lying, fear of speaking out, muteness, misdirection, equivocation, ironic 
acquiescence, ambiguity, vagueness, disinterest and simple misunderstanding 
can all generate an illusion of public unanimity that belies how, or what, any 
given person is actually imagining. 
The world is what offers itself to be imagined, but imagining cannot 
itself be found in the world. Of course, we see many forms for thought, or 
of imaginative investment - signs, images, mnemonics, projects, goods and 
especially other people - in plain view; but we cannot witness directly the 
awareness-imagining-seeing that remains the necessary condition for their 
salience except, to a limited extent, in our own thinking. If we attend to 
these investments (of course, our attention varies) we will find, or can at 
least infer, prescriptions, scripts, charters (mythic and utopian), and diacritic 
rules of thumb for action personally or en groupe: ‘you can be chaotic in Salsa 
and still have fun… but you can’t be chaotic in Tango’ (Jonathan Skinner, 
this volume). Contrastive repertoires of this kind inform us of everyday 
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norms and shared logics against which personal experience can be tested: at 
the same time, they foreground points of conflict or dissonance in our 
common sense understanding of how the world is ordered (‘do I dare to 
tango chaotically?) We may thus take from what is offered delightful 
‘elsewheres’ for playful rumination - like the cities that the forest-dwelling 
Matses draw, as Camilla Morelli tells us here; spaces of adventure that allow 
an out-spilling of imaginative content vis-à-vis the dullness or incoherence 
of the quotidian life-space (Wardle 1999).  
Of all the problems that exist in exercising an anthropological 
imagination perhaps the most difficult to avoid, or even to take account of, 
involves the hubris of confusing culture as a heuristic, a contextualising tool, 
with some specific person’s actual way of imagining things. There is a certain 
vested interest on the part of the anthropologist in treating their own 
overview of the ‘cultural field’ as the actual ground against which the people 
they meet ‘in’ that culture truly imagine things, rather than as a utopic model 
or metric that can help them understand the diverse human activities they 
witness. Once we come to see human subjectivity as, to use a widespread 
analogy, a ‘fold’ of the cultural field, then we have licensed ourselves to pre-
empt whatever imaginative spontaneity the other person may bring to the 
occasion: ‘did you see what she just did?’ says the anthropologist in this 
vein, ‘what a striking enactment of cultural protocol!’ On the one side, to 
use Mattia Fumanti’s phrase (this volume), the freedom of individual 
imagination ‘from the limits of the real’ – including the anthropologist’s 
view of reality - is all too easily blurred. At the same time, when it comes to 
imagining, we can note how, as Nabokov writes, ‘the manner dies with the 
matter, the world dies with the individual’ (1980:252). So, it may be helpful 
cautiously to reverse the ideas involved – the belief in a unified and knowable 
cultural field is best understood as a ‘fold’ of egoistic imagining (Wardle 
2009).  
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Neuro-anatomy has advanced the use of new tools for cortical 
mapping that can pin down the places and times in the brain where electro-
chemical responses to particular objective stimuli happen. In the face of 
these technologies imagination may begin to sound like a flimsy unscientific 
word, but, again, an account of imagining that, in this case, restricts itself to 
brain physiology or brain chemistry is destined to trace ever-decreasing 
circles of evidence and meaning. Neuro-anatomy can point to possible 
physical correlates of imagination, but it does not explain nor even describe 
imagining: on the contrary, it is imagination that lends these data fullness 
and coherence without itself being encompassed. 
Introspection likewise has its hazards as a route to telling what, or 
where, imagination is. When I ‘dwell’ on it, my imagination seems to offer a 
‘private’ ‘space’ into which I can ‘withdraw’. I ‘turn my gaze inward’; I 
ignore what is ‘outside’. I ‘map’ and ‘figure out’, ‘move between’ and ‘arrive 
at’ certain images or ideas. Notice how many metaphors are invoked, with 
greater or lesser caution, when we try to describe imagining; words, symbols, 
and images that I came by while talking about and inhabiting a world with 
others (cf. Lakoff and Johnson 1980). As Wittgenstein points out, it is easy 
to trick ourselves when we use words like ‘inner’ and ‘private’ to describe 
thinking (1953). The subjective ‘innerness’ of imagination is not like the 
inside and outside that respond to each other in the world around us: 
imagination is not, in that sense, a space at all. Subjective ‘innerness’ has, of 
itself, no true ‘outside’ - not even the view reflected in a mirror. Instead, I 
depend on the stance and gaze, touch and gesture of some other being, 
another subject, to gain whatever comprehension I can of myself as an 
exteriority; and the same is true for that other person looking at me (Bakhtin 
1992:36-64). 
This conceptual problem of ‘inner’ versus ‘outer’ viewpoints comes 
to the fore when claims are made about how or where the self, the body, 
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imagining and world overlap, interact or merge. Rubrics for these 
relationships clearly vary across cultural settings and likewise between 
individuals (for example, between Descartes and Locke). Boesoou Erijisi 
told Leenhardt on behalf of the Papuan Kanaks that, for them, the body 
and consciousness are unconnected; what Leenhardt called ‘the body’ was, 
for Erijisi, not a singular thing at all (Clifford 1992:172). French philosopher 
Levy-Bruhl took descriptions of this kind as evidence of ‘participation’; a 
pre-logical merging of self and environment common to primitives (1966). 
But in this instance, at least, the centricity of a self for whom bodily aspects 
blend and extend, is still needed and given. Who, apart from a specific self 
(Erijisi) could we (or Leenhardt) attend to for a view on these matters? 
The metaphors we use have consequences, then, for the kind of 
validity that our presence in the world entertains: they bridge an aporia – a 
gap or ‘blind spot’ – that exists for all human beings out of which plural 
morphologies (and dysmorphias) can emerge. Is it Alice (herself) who has 
shrunk and grown, or is it Wonderland (the environment)? A proportion of 
Euro-American test subjects can be convinced, using a certain apparatus, 
that a rubber hand, objectively unconnected to their body, is physically 
‘their’ hand (Botvinick 1998). Some mobile phone users report symptomatic 
feelings that their phone is somehow an extension of their body.2 Others 
describe ‘out of body’ experiences when observing the visual image of a 
heartbeat projected on a wall.3 The capacity for human consciousness to re-
clothe itself in diverse animate and inanimate material forms is perhaps the 
most widespread of all mythic themes; one that reappears in latterday ideas 
of, for example, bionics or cryogenics. For modern biomedicine, the 
indisputable pragmatic value of placebo treatments present a complex 
parallel problem: their effects can neither be explained solely in terms of 
                                                
2 http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/technology/adrianhon/100006561/how-mobile-phones-
are-turning-into-phantom-limbs/ 
3 http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2013/08/130814124852.htm 
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what individuals imagine about their own bodies, nor by reference to bio-
physical causality alone (Harrington 1999).  
And so, ideas akin to those expressed by the Kanaks need not be 
absolutely ‘remote’ to us, precisely because, as Lévi-Strauss suggests, they 
derive not from ‘outside us, but within us’ (1963:104): they are inherent 
potentials of the asymmetry between imagining and inhabiting a world with 
others. 
Even so, the technologies that organise society are successful to the 
degree that they institutionalise a certain democratic indifference toward 
concerns of these kinds. A creationist, an eco-warrior, or a follower of Ayn 
Rand can simultaneously stop at traffic lights, use an elevator, or an 
automated payment system, (or cross a bridge in Andrew Irving’s example 
here) without entering into conflict over their contrastive imaginings. 
Somewhat differently, Radin describes how, for the Winnebago of the 
American plains, freedom of thought was expected, but so was individual 
responsibility for its consequences (1927). Social coordination, then, can 
(and does) happen without individuals needing to imagine things identically.4 
Two people can arrive at, or evince, similar approved answers to a task 
without following an even remotely related pulse of thought. Their personal 
trajectories coalesce at this moment without conforming at any other: with 
the result that, while, as William James puts it, ‘the trail of the human 
serpent is… over everything’, much of the time its tracks need hardly be 
noticed (1922:64). 
 
Case study 1. Imagining a cultural institution ‘the street corner’. 
 
The ‘corner’ as a site of street action must count as one of the oldest topics 
of urban social research; eponymous examples being William Whyte’s Street 
                                                
4 Kant proposes that ‘logical private sense’ coexists with a more mutually responsive 
‘common sense’, though the relationship can break down (2006:113). 
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Corner Society (1943) and Simon and Burns The Corner (1997), where, in 
both case-studies, the corner is synecdochic of an entire urban situation. It is 
fair to say that most ethnographers of ‘corners’ or ‘cornermen’ have 
described them concretely in terms of a certain kind of relationship to the 
space of the street: ‘corners’ have been evoked as sites of inequality and 
marginality; the place where ‘marginal man’ hangs out. Here, I want to point 
to the abstractness of the ‘corner’ ideal, though, and toward the role of 
individual imagination in enabling its reiteration. At least in Kingston, 
Jamaica – a city I have worked in ethnographically for over two decades - ‘a 
corner’ is not precisely a place, neither is it simply a known group of people. 
The corner is, nonetheless, a knowable quiddity. As a form for thought, the 
corner marshals a cluster of public symbols - a network of overlapping 
imaginative investments - and puts them to work: its effects are pragmatic and 
real. 
Here is an example of how the ‘corner’ becomes an imaginative 
investment. I am talking to CDman who has some recent music - ‘sounds’ - 
that I am interested in. There is no problem with delivering these music 
disks to me, he says, ‘I can bring them to your corner’. I am a little intrigued 
by this spontaneous turn of phrase since we have never spoken to each 
other before. However, CDman has observed how I ‘move’ and, even 
though I have only been in Kingston on this trip a short while, he knows 
where my ‘corner’ is - over the other side of the street with Marshy at 
Marshy’s fish and bammy stand. This might imply that the ‘corner’ is the 
place itself, but that is not the case: it is not the segment of street-side but 
rather an analysis of how and where I interact with Marshy and the rest of 
the ‘crew’ that constitutes ‘my corner’.  
In its simplicity, the image CDman presents of my ‘corner’ extracts 
from the noise of everyday experience something that is both personal and 
categorical. The interpretation is a tautology of course; that I ‘have a corner’, 
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and what I do ‘at’ the corner, evidence each other. In the case of Marshy 
and ‘my’ corner, my reiterated presence ‘there’ has gathered a recognizable 
rhythm – become a distinct gestus for others to notice and acknowledge. 
And, to that extent, ‘my corner’ is now an extension and property of ‘my’ 
bodily person. So, by using the phrase, CDman asserts a conceptually 
delimited past-and-future for my activities and thus creates an effect. I am 
aware of the ‘distance’ or gap between the ‘role’5 being ascribed and how I 
imagined things up to now, but I am happy enough to reorient my common 
sense to take in this new vista. 
So, a concept-word like this invites us (even commands us) to 
acknowledge some coherent and predictable locus or thing - to make it our 
imaginative concern. But as we attend to one quality of ‘the corner’ others 
are occluded. For example, when we then ‘see’ the corner as a functional 
response to, or symbol of, marginalization, underemployment and money 
scarcity - which indeed it can be – we temporarily lose ‘insight’ into the 
corner as a theatre for individual poetics and distinctiveness of character. 
Shift imaginative frames and ‘the corner’ has a chameleon-like capacity to 
change too. 
 This unfolding and retreating of views is unending. We hold onto 
the meaning of the word but we cannot be sure that what concerns us is 
shared, though, for the most part, in terms of getting by, this may barely 
matter. To comprehend ‘the corner’ anthropologically, though, we have 
either to keep alive the fact of varied, divergent, imaginings, or what we see 
becomes an accretion of sociological clichés. As anthropologists, the objects 
of imagination shift and change as we coordinate our horizons with those 
near us. Thus the ethnographer lays her or his stake in the field of social 
inquiry on memories drawn from dwelling next to these other individuals, 
attempting to register what it was that made up their world. In the process 
                                                
5 See Goffman 1961 on ‘role distance’ in Encounters. 
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of exploration, we learn of ‘the corner’ what Max Weber says of other ideal 
types that ‘in its conceptual purity, this mental construct cannot be found 
anywhere in empirical reality’, instead (as we indicated earlier) it is ‘a utopia’ 
(2012:274). 
 
The limits of imagining 
 
‘Is it lack of imagination that makes us come to imagined places, not just 
stay at home?’ asks Elizabeth Bishop in one of her poems, ‘Questions of 
Travel’. Some anthropologists have challenged the significance of imagining 
as a necessary and defining feature of human experience. For instance, 
Ingold has argued that: 
 
[I]magining is not a necessary prelude to our contact with reality, but 
rather an epilogue, and an optional one at that. We do not need to 
think the world in order to live in it, but we do need to live in the 
world in order to think it (1996:118).  
 
The distinction here is puzzling. Why would we assign opposite values to 
these two qualities that seem inextricable one from the other - thinking the 
world and living in it? We must certainly live in a world to think it, equally 
we must think of a world in which to live. Neither phase is ‘optional’, nor is 
the one reducible to its twain. When I solve some small everyday problem I 
begin by imagining a solution, but then, as I grasp at and match up whatever 
materials I can assemble, I re-imagine that outcome over again to bring the 
job to fruition. 6  Every world is, in this sense, uniquely imagination-
dependent; every act of imagining uniquely world-dependent. 
                                                
6 See Levi-Strauss’ famous description of the ‘bricoleur’ or handyman in The Savage 
Mind. 
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Overall, the Kantian description of imagining – that imagination is 
irrevocably co-implicated with living in a knowable world - has been 
confirmed many times as some of the following observations will illustrate. 
With this in view, it is important to note how, despite the essential role of 
imagination in anticipating a knowable world, there are limits to its powers: 
 
The power of imagination… is not as creative as one would like to 
pretend. We cannot think of any form for a rational being than that 
of a human being. Thus the sculptor always depicts a human being 
when he makes an angel or a god (Kant 2006:71). 
 
When we populate other planets in our imagination, Kant goes on to say, we 
use human-like beings as our avatars. We might wish to qualify Kant’s claim 
– rationality can, after all, be dressed as a fox or a spider – however, the key 
is that what limits imagining is everything we have come to know through 
living in and thinking through our world up to now. As they approach closer 
to the mysterious planet Solaris, in Tarkosvky’s beautiful film, the 
cosmonauts’ closest memories are re-materialised and take on a life of their 
own according to a force that can never be known for itself. Nalo 
Hopkinson’s vivacious science fiction novels call on and rearticulate her 
knowledge of life in Jamaica and the Caribbean. In contrast, Nineteenth 
Century Romantics, for whom subjectivity could will into being whatever 
world it imagined, failed to account of the thermostatic control that the 
world as lived, versus the world of imagination, exercise with regard to each 
other.  
Georg Simmel argues that the most recognisable forms of religious 
imagining draw their vivacity from familiar relations such as ‘the child’s faith 
in its parents, the friend in a friend, the individual in his people, the subject 
in its prince’ (1997:280). Radcliffe-Brown comments likewise that aboriginal 
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totemism has nothing esoteric about it in terms of experiential content: 
eaglehawk and crow, the totem animals for certain kin moieties in New 
South Wales, were species which habitually followed foraging bands as they 
burnt the undergrowth for food (1951:17-18). In this respect Neilson’s and 
Pedersen’s argument in this volume that ‘the concrete space affords 
particular imaginary scenarios’ is well-taken. The relationships and 
communities of individual imagining are not, though, a replay of some 
particular objective social-geographical arrangement. In his efficacious ritual 
chants the Piaroa shaman reconfigures for the event in question a poetics 
drawn from an entire life-time of curing practice.7 What can be imagined is 
always in excess of what is immediately given to the senses and is likewise 
more and other than whatever can be communicated meaningfully at any 
one place and moment. 
Imagine this unfamiliar creature: the closer I inspect it in my mind’s 
eye, the more it seems improbably composed from distinct but familiar 
things: the beak and webbed feet of a duck, a body covered in fur with small 
eyes like a mole. In his book, Kant and the Platypus, Eco describes how 
ninety years passed before specimens of the duckbilled platypus were 
recognised as real by a scientific community (2000). Initially encountered as 
a set of incoherent elements, the platypus was widely viewed as a crude 
attempt at fraud: recognising it demanded much more than an empirical 
encounter; it required conceiving and communicating that this kind of 
entity, in its totality, could be a thing at all.  
Piaget shows in a similar vein that for a child coming to recognise 
that the world is made up of distinct and enduring things involves an 
extended process of imaginative-sensory feedback. Crucially, for most 
people, this includes a growing capacity to discern critical sounds and to 
recombine and rhythmicise these as meaningful utterances for others to 
                                                
7 Joanna Overing personal communication. 
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hear. Hence, this dynamic of imagining and sensing, through which the child 
‘constructs reality’, entails also an emergent awareness that this self of theirs 
is something distinct from other aspects of world (1955). Egoistic symbiosis 
with world gives onto self-differentiation from and within world in a 
dialogical (and uncompletable) process. Sudden reappraisals of how the 
world is made up vis-à-vis self (and hence who the self is in the world) give 
imagining-perceiving its characteristic feel of surge and diminuendo. 
 
Feedback between imagining and perceiving 
 
After a great deal of dialogue and cognitive effort, ornithorhyncus, the 
duckbilled platypus, ‘added up’ – perhaps still odd, even uncanny, but no 
longer impossible. Psychologists of perception have provided many insights 
into how complexes of information are composed imaginatively as 
knowable entities, and how coherent perception-imagining can fail. It is 
worth reviewing certain of these findings in detail. 
How perceptual ambiguity is resolved. The psychologist Fred Attneave was 
amongst the first to recognise that ambiguous visual phenomena provide 
valuable insights into how imagination composes reality (1971). For 
example, looking at a cluster of similarly sized equilateral triangles, the 
mind’s eye tends to posit a ‘direction’ in which the triangles are ‘moving’ - it 
is hard to ‘see’ them as having no trend at all. Even so, some residual 
ambiguity always remains. As Bateson points out, meaning and point of 
view are unstable moments of fixture in a looping feedback between 
concepts, self and environment (1979). To this, Mary Douglas has added 
that the degree of effort put into asserting unambiguous meaning for 
particular aspects of the world varies according to the seriousness of 
people’s co-dependence: in contrast, laughter can signal that the imagination 
welcomes incongruity in human relationships (1966). A drive to attain 
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coherence, and to acknowledge incoherence or ambiguity, are equally 
significant for learning about, and narrating our experience of, the world. 
The ‘hauntings’ Peter Collins discusses in this volume, and uncanny 
awareness in general (‘what the hell is going on here?’ as Collins puts it), 
speak to the significance we grasp from disturbances and gaps in this 
process. 
 
How imagining and attending are co-implicated. While we seem to appreciate the 
world as an integrated panorama, the eye itself has clear focus only on a 
small part of the field of vision, the ears only on narrow wavelengths, while 
the full sense of scenic completeness is supplied by our imagination. Two 
experiments show relevant aspects of this. In a well-known ‘gorilla visitor’ 
illusion, psychologists Simons and Chabris ask audiences to attend carefully 
to the number of passes a group of ball players are making in their game. 
Many of those taking this test - though not all - will fail to notice a gorilla-
suited actor walking between the players. In a second experiment, subjects 
arrive at a counter and are handed a form to fill in. When they hand the 
completed form back, a majority will not notice that the receptionist who 
gave it to them has been replaced by someone else. They continue to act as if 
their world were unaltered (Simons 2000). What people think is, and what 
they imagine should be, the case are, much of the time, tautologically 
interdependent. There is a further aspect to the issues involved here which 
Whitehead calls ‘negative prehension’: in order to build a coherent 
perspective, a wide range of information must be actively excluded from 
imagining and perceiving (1929). Hence, theoretically at least, there exists 
for each of us an aggregate of imaginary ‘dark matter’; of unimaginables or 
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things never imagined. 8  The world could always have been imagined 
otherwise. 
The socialness of imagining and attending. Since human acts take place with 
others in mind, then, as Leo Coleman discusses in this volume, imagining, 
whether intentionally or not, is ‘sociocentric’. The experiments above show 
that we are prone to attend to what we have been directed toward by those 
around us, to the exclusion of other information. And, since comprehending 
people’s intentions may well be vital for sustaining my own pattern of life, 
looking where they look (aligning myself with their objective) is generally 
valuable. This alone can explain much of the compulsive quality that certain 
objects and projects hold temporarily for gatherings of people. We do not 
need, then, to invoke group mind or special powers of mimesis as 
Durkheim and Tarde did to explain these feelings. However, in this regard, 
rubrics shift and change. In 1836, Lelut redefined the term ‘hallucination’ to 
describe ‘internal perceptions wrongly attributed to the action of external 
objects’ - hence a signal of insanity. Many people were redefined as insane in 
these terms (including notably Socrates whose ‘daemon’ or guiding voice 
helped him resolve philosophical problems; Leudar and Thomas 2000:8). As 
we have noted, though, when it comes to the relation between imagination 
and world, the distinction between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ is highly 
equivocal: this boundary has inherent potential for manipulation. And, as 
Lugones also tells us, it makes a great difference to how we respond to the 
world imaginatively whether our means of self-expression are calibrated by 
others according to what she calls ‘arrogant perception’ or rather by way of 
a ‘loving’ view open to playfulness and incoherence (1987). 
Patterning. Coherence-seeking, then, drives the relation imagining-and-
perceiving. Psychologist of music, Diana Deutsch has experimented with 
capturing recorded speech and playing it in a repeating loop (Deutsch et al. 
                                                
8 ‘known unknowns’ and ‘unknown unknowns’ to quote former U.S. secretary of 
state, Don Rumsfeld. 
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2011). When speech sounds are reiterated often enough they begin to be 
heard as song/music: this can occur after only a few repetitions. Deutsch’s 
research reveals explicitly what many musicians have always known 
intuitively. For example, John Blacking has described how, for the Venda of 
Southern Africa, u imba, song, is distinguished from, u amba, speech on the 
basis that the former is recited using a regular meter (1973:27). In a related 
observation, Husserl shows how hearing music cannot be a matter simply of 
registering notes one after another, but must involve an extensive listening 
that combines and explores the past while anticipating the future (1964). 
While the present moment has no definable length, it does correspond to a 
subjectively felt continuity of rhythm: and, likewise, we can note how any 
particular human being introduces a distinct syncopation (of gesture, speech, 
attentiveness) into their interactions with others by way of presenting 
themselves. To this extent, human interaction involves a crossing of 
rhythms as well as an unavoidable counterpoint, since the entry of each 
distinct self into interaction brings a new pulse to the unfolding event. Our 
personal utopias have a rhythm to them that emerges from the past and 
protends into the future. Learning how to introduce and perform these 
kinds of rhythm effectively is a painstaking process; learning too well, may, 
as Paul Stoller suggests in this volume, introduce a kind of lifeless 
‘competence’ into communication. 
 
 
 
 
 
Case study 2. Imagining the standpoint of a life. 
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If we turn the pages of Captain TW Whiffen’s The North-West Amazons: 
Notes of Some Months Spent Among Cannibal Tribes, we will come to this 
eye-catching photograph: 
 
INSERT Fig. 15.1. Andoke Shaman and his Wife: photograph by Captain 
T.W. Whiffen. 
 
Whiffen references his illustration in the following way: 
 
The only member of the tribe who varies from his fellows is the 
medicine-man, and he will adopt any idea that appeals to him as an 
addition to the eccentricity of his appearance. One Andoke medicine-
man, whom I photographed, was wearing a turban of bark-cloth dyed 
a brilliant scarlet; but his taste in this particular was purely individual, 
and denoted neither professional nor tribal distinction. The large bag 
shown in the adjoining illustration should be noted, for it was greatly 
admired by the tribe. It appeared to be made… with threads of red 
and undyed palm-fibre. It was not manufactured by the Andoke, but 
had been obtained by barter; however, it was of indigenous make, and 
probably came from the north of the Japura (1915:74). 
 
The explorer has clearly posed his photograph to foreground this ‘eccentric’ 
distinctiveness of the shaman and his wife and we take this cue from him. 
However, the closer we look at their faces the more we are struck by some 
indefinable pathos: for once, the sentimentalism ‘I feel for them’ captures a 
certain literal truth: I feel-imagine - I initiate a certain rhythm and 
directedness, a pattern of life - on their behalf. Their expressions resist 
interpretation, and precisely for that reason, my thoughts attempt to cross 
the boundary of appearance trying to find a way to comprehend this stance 
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of theirs from their point of view. 
 
INSERT Fig. 15.2. Andoke shaman and his wife (section) 
 
Below, is an image of the photographer himself from his archive: the pipe-
smoking Captain is on the left, and his servant John Brown, who 
accompanied him through the Putumayan jungle, is to the right.  
 
 
INSERT Fig. 15.3. Captain T.W. Whiffen and John Brown (section): 
unknown photographer. 
 
These faces intrigue us too because they also resist any familiar 
interpretation. In his monograph, Whiffen describes John Brown as 
‘invaluable throughout the expedition… more loyal and more devoted than 
a traveller… has reason to anticipate of any black servant’ (1915:3). It is 
hard to ‘find’ exactly that sentiment ‘in’ the photograph, though. 
 
This last picture is a section of a portrait of John Brown,9 again by Whiffen. 
This time Brown is carefully dressed - with a mark of distinction of his own, 
a top hat. The contrast with the other photograph is striking and whatever 
we thought we knew about Brown undergoes an intuitive re-organisation 
when we look at it. 
 
INSERT Fig. 15.4. John Brown: photograph by Captain T.W. Whiffen. 
 
                                                
9 The positive identification of John Brown in these two photographs was made for 
me by Ramiro Rojas Brown, his grandson (see also Rojas Brown 2010). I am grateful 
to Jocelyn Dudding at the Cambridge Museum of Archaeology and Anthropology for 
making these and other of Whiffen’s archival photographs available for viewing. 
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There is a great deal, potentially an infinite amount, that we could add by 
way of context which might help us further understand the Andoque 
shaman and his wife, and likewise Captain Whiffen and John Brown, not to 
mention the interrelationships of all four. I am less interested here in how a 
good or true interpretation in those terms would come about.10 What I am 
aiming at is more immediate and primary. Engagement with these faces, and 
then the further attempt to comprehend the stances or standpoints 
involved, starts when their gaze meets ours and we recognise, not a genus or 
type of person, but rather a life distinct to itself. This moment, which 
combines recognition but also resistance, is what provoked us to imagine 
those people more fully and to ask (ourselves) for more context. So, the 
germ of intuition out of which an anthropological interpretation begins to 
unfold has in it a contradiction, because the imaginative process has ceased 
if, or when, I claim that the people involved are best understood as products 
or ‘folds’ of a particular epoch, or of a network of relations, or that their 
lives are expressions of a particular ontology. Here then, is one kind of 
tension or friction in the ‘anthropological imagination’ that is ignored if my 
priority is to move toward a final assessment. This ability to recognise the 
lives of others as on a par with my own is an imaginative ability. 
‘Imagination’, Hannah Arendt suggests, ‘is the only inner compass we have, 
we are contemporaries only as far as our imagination reaches’ (1953:392). 
 
Concluding Remarks: a kingdom of imaginative ends 
 
My son, Max (twelve at the time of writing), informs me that he has become 
interested in the power of what he calls ‘immaterial objects’. In the yard of 
our village school two boys were playing, he tells me. The first gifted the 
second an imaginary weapon, ‘fire sword’, while reserving to himself 
                                                
10 These comments are prefatory to a longer study of John Brown currently underway. 
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‘diamond sword’ to ‘fight’ with. Soon boy number two wanted to have the 
use of ‘diamond sword’, but his playmate refused to relinquish it. An 
argument started, which was only resolved by a teacher sending boy number 
one to sit on the ‘naughty step’ because he had refused to ‘share’. Max was 
struck by how the boys argued as if the things in question were real and by 
how the teacher took them seriously. 
 
Some important features of imagining are foregrounded especially clearly in 
this struggle over ‘diamond sword’ and ‘fire sword’. Certainly, when we 
consider them from the side of imagination, all objects, tangible or 
otherwise, have an ‘immaterial’ dimension since, without the contribution of 
imagining, they are not objects at all. At the same time, absolutely 
immaterial, or virtual, entities hold an ever more compelling position within 
our modern horizons where more and more is invested imaginatively in 
goods that - or people who - have no tangible presence, but whose social 
and material effects are felt nonetheless. The exchange value of money is 
perhaps the most ubiquitous example, but there are certainly at least as 
many of these intangible presences in the life of the modern person as there 
were amongst the animist thinkers who conversed with anthropologists 
such as Paul Radin or Irving Hallowell. In this respect, where an object is 
invested with significance by only one or a few then it is perhaps easily 
disregarded, but where the investment is evidently made by many, then it 
acquires a power of ‘dull compulsion’, to use Karl Marx’s phrase, becoming 
entangled and imbricated with many other concepts, aims, actions, 
institutions – an obstacle that all must clamber over or sidle around. The 
swords of the two boys are immaterial, but their tears and anger are not, nor 
are the effects of the teacher’s intervention. One boy must sit on the 
‘naughty step’ while the other perhaps - who can say? – finally and 
triumphantly raises ‘diamond sword’ aloft to his mind’s eye.  
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Imagining puts in play not only a familiar community of voices and valued 
things gathered during a lifetime in the world, but also looser feelings, 
untethered memories and uncanny absences and presences. It has a rhythm 
of ebbs and flows that responds to contingent impulses without producing 
any fully necessary sequence; more an elusive stream, or a serpentine crawl, 
to use William James’ metaphors (see Mark Harris, this volume). For each of 
us, this self-generated common sense ordering is unique. And, since it 
preempts sense experience, imagination is an irrevocable constitutor of our 
realities. We are left with a puzzle: knowing what and how someone 
imagines is indispensible to understanding their vision of their world – the 
primary anthropological task - but we have no direct access to these qualities 
only their exterior show. We see a rhythm of activity and amidst that we 
intuit imagining at work. On our side, as observers and participants, is the 
fact that imagination cannot absolutely depart from the world it inhabits. So, 
the closer we are to someone, the more likely it is that what is important to 
them imaginatively may be close at hand (even if, like ‘diamond sword’, it 
has no material presence). At the same time, we rely on our standpoint 
outside their world of experience – our own common sense - in order to 
appreciate theirs in its own right. 
 
When it comes to the correlation between imagining and world, each of us 
has little option but to rely on our own intuitive sense. As Malinowski 
points out, when I explore this or that person’s vision of their world, then I 
engage in an imaginative endeavour: what does this stance of theirs consist 
in? What are they attending to, invested in, intent upon? What images, 
parables, folktales, analogies or metaphors do they ‘live by’? From their view 
on their world, what do they know, or hold to be self-evident and what does 
all this add to our common anthropological knowledge? In this broadest 
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sense, anthropology treats the imaginative lives of each and all as elements 
of what Kant called a ‘kingdom of ends’ – each self, as much as the next, 
expresses a distinctive ‘world knowledge’ (weltkenntnis) that undergoes 
change as it directs itself toward life with others; to cultivating a life in 
certain ways alone, in other ways in common. The idea of a kingdom of 
imaginative ends, in turn, provides a horizon for the work of anthropology - 
that is, for the anthropological imagination. 
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